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STATE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS,
FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES AND
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS
Wallace F. Caldwell*
Members of minority groups face widespread discrimination1 when
they seek to patronize barber shops, bars, beauty shops, cafes, hotels,
lunch counters, motels, parks, resorts, restaurants, taverns, theaters,
and other places offering services to the public. Because of their race,
creed, color or national origin, they are often barred from access to
some places and given unequal service in others.2 Although Negroes
are the principal subjects of discrimination in the use and operation of
such facilities, Jews, Chinese, American Indians, Japanese, Mexicans,
and others are frequently subjected to the same treatment. For example, Jews are apt to be barred from hotels and resorts. Mexicans may
find it impossible to hold jobs that require extensive travel; they may
be kept out of meeting rooms, banquet halls and restaurants. American
Indians may be barred from cafes, taverns, barber shops and theaters.
The pervasive nature of these discriminatory practices is self evident
and specific examples could be cited almost indefinitely.' Discrimination in public accommodations exists throughout the country and is not
restricted to any particular state or geographic region. It applies in
some form to members of all minority groups.
This article purports to investigate state legislation which prohibits
discrimination in public accommodations and some of the more important administrative efforts which have been undertaken to implement
these statutes. More specifically, the article attempts to: (1) summarize legislation currently in effect which prohibits discrimination in
public accommodations; (2) investigate litigation, which has contested
public accommodations statutes in order to determine whether the
statutes threaten wider and more fundamental liberties; and (3) review some of the main activities of anti-discrimination commissions* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Kansas State University.
1The term "discrimination" as used herein means differential treatment of indi-

viduals or groups of individuals on the basis of ethnic, religious or racial categorizations which has no relation to individual capacities or merits or to the concrete
behavior
of individuals. ALmoND, THE NATURE OF PaRjunicF 50-52 (1958).
2
PRESIDENT'S CoMM. ON CIM IZIGHTS,
STATE ADVISORY CoMms. TO THE
REPORT (1961).

1See

To SECURE THESE R GHTS 76 (1947).
CommN oN CIvm RIGHTS, THE 50 STATES

[841]
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agencies which have undertaken to execute or apply public accommodation laws.
I.

SUMMARY OF LAWS

Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia' have enacted civil
rights statutes providing for criminal, civil and/or administrative remedies for persons subjected to discriminatory treatment in the use of
public accommodations. Those states with effective laws, dates they
were first enacted and remedies available are outlined below.5
A. Objectives
The legal objective of public accommodations statutes is to make
equal access to and the use of places of public accommodation, resort
and amusement a public right. In order to insure that the right is
realized, states have declared it to be their public policy, in the interest
of the general welfare, to use the police power to prohibit discrimination.'

1. Definition. Public accommodations are usually thought of in a
§8 11.60230-240 (1962) ;
CAL. CIV. CODE 88 25-1-1 to -2-5 (1953);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv.: 53-35 (1961);

4 ALASKA STAT.

DE.

CODE ANN. tit 6, ch. 45 (1963);
§§ 18-7301 to -7303 (1965);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 13-1 to -4 (Smith-Hurd, 1961), ch. 43, § 133 (1944);
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-901 to -914 (1961);
IOWA CODE ANN.
735.1.-.5 (1950);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2424 (Supp. 1962);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 137, § 50 (1954);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 11 (1964) ;
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 5-8 (1957), ch. 272, §§ 9B, 92A (1963);
IDAHO CODE ANN.

§§

MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.343-.344 (1962);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327.09 (1947);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-211 (1962);

NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-101 to -102 (1954);
N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-1, -2, -4, and -5 (1963);
N. J. STAT. ANN. 8§ 10-1-2 to -1-7, 18-25-1 to -25-6 (1963);
N. M. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-8-1 to -8-7 (1963).;
N. Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 4-40 to -41
EXECUTIVE LAW § 15-2901,
PENAL LAW § 46-513 to -515;
N. D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-30 (1963);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2901-35-36 (Page 1954);
ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 30.670-.680 (1963);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4654 (1963);
R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 11-24-1 to -24-6 (1956);
S. D. SESS. LAWS ch. 58 (1963) ;
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1451-52 (1958);
WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.60.010-.170, 9.91.010 (1962);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.04 (1958) ;
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-83.1 to -83.2 (1963);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2901 to -2911 (1951).
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non-legal sense simply as facilities "open to the public. '"r In a more
formal sense, they are defined in a variety of ways. For purpose of
analysis, the statutes may be divided into four main categories: (1)
statutes with relatively narrow coverage; (2) statutes which have

added names of new places to an older specific list; (3) statutes which
have added examples of newer types of public places, preceded or
followed by such language as, "to include, but not to be limited to," or,
5 STATES WITH PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS, DATES
FIRST PASSED AND REMEDIES AVAILABLEa
State
Alaska
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Montanae
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Date Law
First Passed
1945b
1893
1885
1884
1963
1869
1961
1885
1885
1884
1874
1959
1963
1865
1885
1885
1955
1885
1961
1884
1955
1874
1961
1884
1953
1887
1885
1963
1957
1890
1895
1961

Criminal

Remedies
Civil
Administrative

X

X

X
X
X
x
X
X
X
x
X
X

X
X
X

x
X
X
x
x
x
x
X
x
X
X
X
x
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
Xd

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

a For statutory citation, see note 4 supra.
b Statute was initially enacted by the Alaska Territorial Legislature.
0 Statute does not contain specific provision for civil damages, but state courts have
awarded them.
dA newly created Civil Rights Commission will evidently have authority to provide
administrative remedies.
e Statute contains no penalty provision.
6 E.g., the New Mexico statute provides that, "It is hereby declared to be the policy
of the state... in the exercise of its power for the protection of the public welfare, to
prohibit discrimination in places of public accommodation, resort or amusement due to
race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin." N. M. STAT. ANN. § 49-8-1 (1963).
7GnPEaNBEG, RAcE RELATIONS AND AMEmiCAN LAw 79 (1959).
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"and all other places, etc."; and (4) statutes written broad enough to
cover all places which offer services to the public, without naming
specific types of places.
The District of Columbia and Maryland statutes are examples of
the "narrow coverage" category. The District's law applies only to
licensed establishments. The Maryland statute defines public accommodations as:
...
any hotel, restaurant, inn, motel or an establishment commonly known
or recognized as regularly engaged in the business of providing sleeping
accommodations, or serving food, or both, for a consideration, and which
is open to the general public; except that premises or portions of premises
primarily devoted to the sale of alcoholic beverages and generally described as bars, taverns, or cocktail lounges are not places of public
accommodation. 8
New York is an example of a state which fits into the "new name to
an old list" category. Public accommodations, as defined by New
York's Executive Law, include:
taverns, road houses, hotels, motels, whether conducted for the
entertainment of transient guests or for the accommodation of those
seeking health, recreation or rest, or restaurants, or eating houses, or any
place where food is sold for consumption on the premises; buffets,
saloons, barrooms, or any store, park or enclosure where spirituous or
malt liquors are sold; ice cream parlors, confectionaries, soda fountains,
and all stores where ice cream, ice and fruit preparations or their derivatives, or where beverages of any kind are retailed for consumption on the
premises; retail stores and establishments dealing with goods or services
of any kind, dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, bathhouses, swimming pools,
laundries and all other cleaning establishments, barber shops, beauty
parlors, theatres, motion picture houses, airdromes, roof gardens, music
halls, race courses, skating rinks, amusement and recreation parks, trailer
camps, resort camps, fairs, bowling alleys, golf courses, gymnasiums,
shooting galleries, billiard and pool parlors; garages, all public conveyances operated on land or water or in the air, as well as the stations and
terminals thereof; travel or tour advisory services, agencies or bureaus;
public halls and public elevators of buildings and structures occupied by
two or more tenants, or by the owner and one or more tenants.9
...inns,

New Jersey and New Mexico statutes have somewhat similar pro-

visions.
Most public accommodations laws fit more or less into the third

category of "newer examples followed or preceded by general lan8
9

MD. ANN. CODE

N. Y.

art. 49B, § 11 (1964).
§ 292(9) (1952).

EXECUTIVE LAW

1965]

STATE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS

guage." Included are Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington and Wisconsin. The Washington statute, for example, provides
that:
Any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage or amusement
is hereby defined to include, but iwt to be limited to, any public place,
licensed or unlicensed, kept for gain, hire or reward, or where charges
are made for admission, service, occupancy or use of any property -or
facilities, whether conducted for the entertainment, housing or lodging
of transient guests, or for the benefit, use or accommodation of those
seeking health, recreation or rest, or for the sale of goods and merchandise,
or for the rendering of personal services, or for public conveyance or
transportation on land, water or in the air, including the stations and
terminals thereof and the garaging of vehicles, or where food or beverages
of any kind are sold for consumption on the premises, or where public
amusement, entertainment, sports or recreation of any kind is offered
with or without charge, or where medical service or.care is made available,
or where the public gathers, congregates, or assembles for amusement,
recreation or public purposes, or public halls, public elevators and public
washrooms or buildings and structures occupied by two, or more tenants,
or any public library or any educational institution wholly or partially
supported by public funds, or schools of special instruction, or nursery
schools, or day care centers or children's camps....
10
The fourth category, "broad and general statutory provisions," are
evidently designed to cover all places which offer services to the public,
and are found in several states. For example, California law specifies
that "all citizens within the jurisdiction of this state are entitled to the
full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or
services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. M
This statute is unique in that it refers to "business establishments"
without using the term "public accommodations."' 2
The Montana public accommodations statute simply provides that
"no person, partnership, corporation, association or organization owning or managing any place of public accommodation or amusement
shall discriminate against any person or group of persons solely on the
ground of race, color or creed."'"
Delaware, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont and
10 WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.91.010(d) (1961). (Emphasis added.)
11
CAL. CIV. CODE, § 51 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
12
E.g., Horowitz, The 1959 California Equal Rights in 'Business Establishments'
Statute-A Problem it Statutory Application,33 So. CAL. L. REv. 260 (1960).
'sMoNT. REV. CoDEs ANN. § 64-211 (1962).
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Wyoming statutes are similarly broad and evidently meant to be inclusive.
2. Applicability. Public accommodations statutes have broad provisions of applicability. They are commonly addressed to "any person
who shall violate," "whoever denies," "every person who violates,"
"whoever violates," "any person who violates," "any person violating," or "any person who shall willfully violate." Several statutes are
somewhat more specific. For example, Idaho indicates that "every person" subject to the law:
...
shall be construed to include any owner, lessee, proprietor, manager,
agent or employee whether one or more natural persons, partnerships,
associations, organizations, corporations, cooperatives, legal representatives, trustees, receivers, of this state and its political subdivisions, boards
and commissions, engaged in or exercising control over the operation of
any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage or amusement. 14
Several other states, e.g., Alaska, California, Iowa and Maine, make
their laws applicable to "anyone who aids in or incites the denial of
equal accommodations." Some statutes may also be used against those
who participate in discriminatory advertising. Rhode Island's provision concerning advertising is typical:
No person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent,
agent or employee of any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement shall directly or indirectly.., publish, circulate, issue, display, post
or mail any written, printed or painted communication, notice or advertisement, to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such place shall be refused, withheld from or
denied to any person on account of race or color, religion or country of
ancestral origin, or that the patronage or custom thereat of any person
belonging,to or purporting to be of any particular race or color, religion
or country of ancestral origin is unwelcome, objectionable or not acceptable, desired or solicited. 15
Several other statutes provide that the production of any such communication shall be presumptive evidence in any legal action. However, Colorado, New York and Massachusetts statutes specify that
this provision does not apply to the mailing of private communications
sent in response to specific written inquiries.
3. FacilitiesCovered. Public accommodations statutes vary widely
as to type of facilities covered. Almost all legislation includes inns,
14 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7302(a) (1965).
15 R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-24-2 (1956)
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restaurants, hotels and taverns. These provisions obviously trace back
to common law requirements which bound innkeepers, in the absence
of reasonable grounds for refusal, to receive, lodge and feed all travelers." In addition, it is generally acknowledged that, at common law,
public carriers and certain types of utilities are under a duty not to
refuse service except for just cause, but other places and facilities are
apparently free to discriminate as they see fit. Some states have
explicitly rejected this common law duty, and other factors limit its
effectiveness.17 But the general trend in states having public accommodations statutes has been to broaden common law provisions to
include under statutory coverage newer types of service facilities and
professional and business places not ordinarily thought of as "public
accommodations." Those services and facilities affected by this trend
include a wide variety of public and private business facilities, medical
and health, recreational and athletic, educational, transportation and
even public and publicly assisted housing facilities. This trend, evident
in many states, has not been at all uniform. In any given instance,
determination of coverage will not only depend upon the wording, but
also upon judicial construction of a statute.
4. Limiting Clauses. Most public accommodations statutes contain
limiting clauses which restrict their applicability. The obvious purpose
of limitations is to make it clear that the statutes do not give superior
rights, but merely place members of minority groups on the same level
and subject to the same reasonable disabilities as other citizens.
It is, for example, not unusual to find provisions in statutes that they
shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege not applicable to
citizens of every color, race, ancestry, or national origin. Another
common limitation provides that nothing in the statutes shall be construed to apply to places which are distinctly private, such as fraternal
organizations and private clubs. Some statutes specifically exclude
from coverage religious and sectarian educational institutions.
5. Liberal Construction and Severability Clauses. A number of
states, in an obvious attempt to convey legislative intent, have provided
statutory clauses of liberal construction and severability provisions.
The Rhode Island statute, for example, stipulates that "the provisions
of... [the law] ...shall be construed liberally for the accomplish1

6E.g., Beale, INNYEPERS AND HoTELs 2, 42 passim (1906).
17 See, e.g., Note, Legislative Attempts to Eliminate Racial and Religious Discrimi-

nation, 39 CoLum. L. REv. 986 (1939).
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ment of the purposes thereof, and any law inconsistent with any provision thereof shall not apply.' 8 The severability clause provides that:
if any clause, sentence, paragraph or part of... [the law] ...or the ap-

plication thereof to any person or circumstance shall, for any reason, be
adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder of said sections
or their application to other persons or circumstances. 9
B. Remedies
Depending upon the specific statutory provisions, and in some
instances on judicial precedent, persons subjected to discrimination
in the use of public accommodations may seek civil, criminal and/or
administrative remedies.
1. No remedy. The Montana public accommodations statute does
not provide a penalty provision, and state courts have not clarified
liability. Therefore, it is impossible to determine precisely what sanction a violation would incur. Montana's attorney general entertains
"serious doubt that one might be criminally punished""0 for violating
the law. In so far as civil liability is concerned, Montana law provides
that, "for every wrong there is a remedy."'" However, it would be
necessary in a civil action for a person to show that he had actually
suffered damages, and the extent thereof. Another provision of Montana law specifies that:
in any. action for a breach of obligation not arising from contract, where
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or
presumed, the jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages
22
for the sake of example, and by way of punishing the defendant.
It has been held in Montana, however, that before exemplary damages
may be awarded, actual damages must first be found to have existed.
Therefore, it is possible to assume that the Montana public accommodations statute provides a basis of civil liability to the extent of actual
damages incurred, and that exemplary damages may be awarded after
jury has found actual damages.
18 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-24-5 (1956).
2190 Ib"l

Letter from Attorney General Forrest H. Anderson, State of Montana to Wallace
F. Caldwell, Oct 30, 196Z
21 MONT. Ray. CODES ANN. fit 49, § 115 (1962).
2z Ibid

2 Gilham v. Devereaux, 67 Mont 75, 214 Pac. 606 (192.3).
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2. Civil remedy. California's "business establishments" statute provides only actual and limited exemplary civil damages:
Whoever denies, or who aids, or incites such denial, or whoever makes
any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of color, race,
religion, ancestry or national origin, contrary to the provisions of... this

code, is liable for each and every such offense for the actual damiges, and
two hundred fifty dollars ($250) in addition thereto .... 2
3. Criminal remedies. Eleven states-the District of Columbia,
Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming-provide only criminal
penalties. Iowa courts have, on occasion, awarded civil damages. 5
Whether civil action can be brought under statutes which only provide
criminal penalties appears to be an open question in some other states.
For example, Mr. Richard F. Upton, Chairman of the New Hampshire
Civil Rights Committee, was asked if the provisions of that state's law
precluded civil action. He replied:
I do not know the answer to your question. The section to which you
refer was put into the bill in the State Senate by senators who were

unfriendly to the proposal. The supporters of the bill were forced to
accept the amendment.
I think the people who wrote this amendment were trying to oiftlaw civil
suits altogether but there is quite a question in my mind whether they
succeeded in so doing because
the language which they employed does
28
leave it open to some doubt.
Specific penalties assessed by these statutes are fines and/or imprisonment. Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota and
Wyoming statutes indicate that violation is a misdemeanor. District
of Columbia, Maine, New Hampshire, South Dakota and Verniont
statutes impose fines and/or imprisonment without indicating the
nature of the offense. Nebraska, New Mexico, New Hampshire and
South Dakota statutes provide for fines without imprisonment. The
District of Columbia statute provides for a fine and forfeiture of business license. The Maine statute varies somewhat in that it provides
for fine and/or imprisonment for a first offense and a substantial inCiv. CoDE § 52 (1959)
e.g., Goostree, T7he Iowa Civil Rights Statute: A Problem of Enforcement,
37 Iow.A L. REv. 242-44 (1951). Civil suits have also been successfully pursued in
Michigan, Pennsylvania and Washington, although statutes in effect prescribed only
criminal
penalties.
20
Letter from Richard F. Upton to Wallace F. Cadwell, Oct. 23, 1962.
24 CA..
25 See,
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crease in the fine for each additional offense. Imprisonment provisions,
however, remain the same for additional offenses.
The amount of the fines which may be levied varies. Vermont provides for a maximum of 500 dollars. The District of Columbia provides for a minimum of fifty dollars. Idaho allows a fine not to exceed
300 dollars. Iowa, North Dakota and Wyoming specify a maximum
fine of 100 dollars. South Dakota provides for a maximum of 200
dollars. The Maine statute allows a fine of not more than 200 dollars
for a first offense and a maximum of 500 dollars for each additional
offense. Nebraska provides a minimum of twenty-five dollars and a
maximum of 100 dollars; in addition, the violator must pay the costs
of prosecution. New Hampshire's maximum fine is 100 dollars and the
minimum ten dollars. New Mexico's statute subjects a violator to a
fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than fifty dollars. Imprisonment provisions may also vary. Iowa, Maine, North Dakota and Vermont provide for imprisonment not to exceed thirty days. Wyoming
specifies a maximum term of ninety days. Idaho provides for maximum imprisonment of six months.
4. Criminal and/or civil remedies. Illinois, Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes provide for both criminal and civil remedies. The Illinois
statute allows a criminal penalty not to exceed a 1,000 dollar fine or
imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. Also, an operator
of a place of accommodation, who commits a violation, is liable to the
aggrieved person in a civil action for not less than 100 dollars, nor more
than 1,000 dollars. The Illinois attorney general or state's attorney of
the county where the violation occurs may also bring an action in equity
to enjoin the facility as a public nuisance. Violation of the injunction
may be summarily treated as contempt of court.
Any person who violates Minnesota's public accommodations law
is deemed to be guilty of a gross misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or by a fine of not more than 1,000
dollars. In addition, the violator is liable in a civil suit to the aggrieved
person for damages not to exceed 500 dollars.
Wisconsin allows both criminal and civil action. The criminal sanction is a fine of not more than 200 dollars and/or imprisonment for
not more than six months. An aggrieved person may also recover damages of not less than twenty-five dollars, and costs, in a civil suit.
5. Criminal and/or civil and administrative remedies. The Alaska,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massa-
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chusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Pennsylvania and Washington public accommodations statutes
allow proceedings, under certain circumstances, by anti-discrimination
commissions. In all of these states, except for Maryland and Rhode
Island, administrative action is in addition to, or in lieu of, criminal
and/or civil remedies. Various statutory provisions regarding these
remedies are outlined in the Appendix at the end of this article.
II. LiTIGATION

A. Civil Rights Cases
The first public accommodations statutes appeared shortly after the
Civil War. State legislation, with a few exceptions, followed an abortive attempt by Congress to act in the area." Prior to that time, it was
thought that the Constitution did no contain adequate authority for
Congress to legislate concerning encroachments upon civil rights by
state governments or private individuals. Following the enactment of
the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, Congress adopted
a series of seven implementing statutes aimed specifically at prohibiting discriminatory practices by both state governments and private
individuals.2 " Among these statutes was the Civil Rights Act of March
1, 1875,20 which was designed to guarantee to members of minority
groups equal accommodations in all inns, public conveyances, theaters
and other places of amusement. This statute was tested before the
United States Supreme Court in the famous Civil Rights Cases." Mr.
Justice Bradley, speaking for the majority of the Court, Mr. Justice
Harlan dissenting, held that the fourteenth amendment did not invest
Congress with power to legislate on subjects which were exclusively
within the domain of state authority. The wrongful act of one individual against another was regarded as a private wrong, subject only
to state control.,"
Subsequent application of the rule established in the Civil Rights
Cases has been fairly consistent. The Supreme Court has interpreted
the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment to limit invasions of civil
27

Early legislation is discussed in STEPHENSON, RACE DIsTINCTIoNs IN AMERICAN

LAW
2 8 (1910).

See, e.g., SWISHER, AuRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 312 (1943) ; and
Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIcH. L. REV. 1323

(1952).

29 18 Stat. 335 (1857).
The statute is thoroughly analyzed by Wormuth, The
Present Status of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 6 UTAH L. REv. 153 (1958).

30
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
81

KONVITZ, THE CONSTITUTION

AND

CIVIL RiGHTS 8-28 (1947).
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liberties by state agencies only, and not to restrain private individuals.
Protection afforded is dependent on the bounds of the concept of "state
action." If "state action" cannot be shown, then the Constitution is
of no avail in providing relief for the offended person. However, recent
Supreme Court decisions32 have substantially extended the meaning
of "state action." The cases in question determined that Negroes could
not be prosecuted on trespass charges for seeking services in privately
owned stores in cities where segregation was the official public policy.
The Court, however, left open the corollary question: What happens
in a community without segregation laws when individual owners refuse
to serve members of minority groups? It would seem that in order to
bring the fourteenth amendment to bear on this question, the Civil
Rights Cases would have to be overruled.
B. Civil Rights Act of 1964
A partial national solution to discrimination in public accommodations was provided on July 2, 1964, when President Johnson signed
into law the Federal Civil Rights Act, 3 the first national legislation on
the subject since Reconstruction.
Title II of the act is of particular importance to this article. It undertakes, in the interest of the general welfare, to prohibit discrimination
in a wide variety of public accommodations which affect interstate commerce. Anyone denied rights under title II is authorized to sue in
federal district court for preventive relief by civil injunction. District
courts, in their discretion, may permit the United States Attorney
General to intervene or bring a civil action when he has reasonable
cause to believe that a person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full exercise of rights granted under
the act. If the alleged discrimination takes place in a state which has
a public accommodations law, thirty days written notice must be given
to the appropriate state authority before suit can be initiated in federal
court. If the alleged discrimination takes place in a state which has
no public accommodations law, district courts may refer the matter to
the Community Relations Service (established by title X of the act)
for 60 to 120 days, if there is a reasonable chance of obtaining voluntary compliance.
The constitutionality of title II was decided by the United States
32 Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) ; Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963) ; Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963).
3378 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000 (1964).
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Supreme Court on December 14, 1964, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States."' The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Clark, dismissed due process and involuntary servitude objections. The core of
the opnion dealt with whether Congress, in passing the act, exceeded
its power to regulate commerce. In answering the question, Mr. Justice
Clark adroitly sidestepped the Civil Rights Cases, holding that the Civil
Rights Act of March 1, 1875, had not been conceived in terms of the
commerce power. After finding "overwhelming evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate travel," 5 and relying
heavily upon Chief Justice Marshall's definition of the commerce clause
in Gibbons v. Ogden,"8 Mr. Justice Clark had little trouble finding the
operations of the motel in question within the scope of Congressional
regulatory powers.
Where does the Heart of Atlanta Motel case leave those states with
public accommodations statutes? The best answer seems to be that
they are almost unaffected. As noted above, before any suit alleging
discrimination in the use of public accommodations can take place in
federal court, notice must be given appropriate state authorities to
allow an opportunity for state remedies to have effect. In addition, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers only accommodations which affect
interstate commerce. As a matter of fact, many states have much more
comprehensive statutes currently in force. Furthermore, the prevailing philosophy of the new Civil Rights Act is to let states solve complaints without federal intervention. Thus, it can still reasonably be
argued that the main burden of protecting minority group citizens from
discrimination in the use of public accommodations lies with state government.
C. Constitutionality
Prior to the recent Heart of Atlanta Motel case, a number of cases
had tested the constitutionality of public accommodations statutes in
state courts, and in at least two important cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court. Two nineteenth-century state cases had more
or less settled most constitutional objections. The first case, Donnell
v. State,"7 arose from the enforcement of Reconstruction legislation in
Mississippi. A doorkeeper of a concert hall, in conflict with a Mississippi law securing to people of all races equal accommodations in public
conveyances and places of entertainment or amusement, had attempted
34 379 U.S. 241 (1964).

115Id. at 253.

36
37

22
48 U.S.
Miss. (9
661Wheat)
(1873). 1 (1824).
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to separate two Negroes from a white audience. In a habeas corpus
proceeding resulting from a conviction for this discriminatory act, the
Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the conviction against a plea that
the statute took private property for public use without compensation,
stated:
We see no constitutional objection to that portion of the statute which has
application to this case; counsel for the appellant has pointed to none,
except the inhibition that private property shall not be taken for public
use unless compensation be first made. It is not perceived in what manner
this law infringes that section of the bill of rights. The assertion of a
right in all persons to be admitted to a theatrical entertainment, and the
punishment as an offense the act of the owner, lessee or manager, who
denies or refuses to sell a ticket to a person for the reasons asserted in
these proceedings, in no sense appropriates
the private property of the
38
lessee, owner or manager, to the public use.
The second, and still considered to be a leading case, was People v.
King,"D which resulted when three Negroes were denied tickets to a
New York skating rink because of their color. The main contention,
on appeal from a conviction for violating New York's public accommodations law, was that the law unconstitutionally interfered with
private rights by restricting the owner of property in its lawful use.
The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that the due process clause
must be interpreted liberally, but that life, liberty and property might
justly be affected by law which did not transcend the limitations of the
Constitution. The public accommodations statute was viewed as a
legitimate exercise by the state of the police power:
... a power incapable of exact definition, but the existence of which is
essential to every well-ordered government. By means of this power the
legislature exercises a supervision over matters involving the common
weal and enforces the observance, by each individual member of society,
of the duties which he owes to others and to the community at large. It
may be exerted whenever necessary to secure the peace, good order,
health, morals and general welfare of the community, and the propriety of
its exercise within constitutional limits is purely a matter of legislative
discretion with which the courts cannot interfere. In short, the police
power covers a wide range of particular unexpressed powers reserved to
the state affecting 40
freedom of action, personal conduct and the use and
control of property.
The constitutionality of public accommodations statutes has been
38 Id. at 682.

39 110 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245 (1888).

40 Id. at 423-24. 18 N.E. at 246-47.
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challenged in a number of other cases, 4 but most do not present novel
arguments. However, an Illinois case, Pickett v. Kuchan,42 raised two
arguments not previously made in Donnell and King. The Pickett
case resulted when a Negro was refused a ticket for admission to the
main floor of a theater. The appellant, on appeal from conviction,
maintained that operating a theater was a private business, that any
regulation which served to diminish freedom of contract deprived him
of due process of law and that any legislation which undertook to
regulate the business of operating a theater and did not regulate other
businesses which catered to the public was arbitrary and discriminatory. The Illinois Supreme Court, upholding the statute, said:
The right of the State to regulate theaters and all places of public amusement is universally recognized.... The Legislature has the power to
classify businesses for purposes of regulation, and the 'Courts will not
disturb the classification unless it is clear that there is no fair reason or
basis for the inclusion of the business regulated and the exclusion of other
private businesses.. .. The statute in question is ... a regulation of places

of public entertainment and amusement, requiring that the facilities and
accommodations of such places be extended to all without discrimination,
and there is no merit to the contention of appellant that it deprives him of
his liberty or property without due process of law .... The legislature
undoubtedly had the power to pass the act in question. Whether it acted
wisely is a matter for it to determine. The judiciary have nothing to do
with the wisdom of policy or legislation. 43
Public accommodations statutes first came to the United States
Supreme Court in Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg.44 The case involved the exclusion from a race track of a person who made his livelihood publishing a newssheet of racing information. California's
Supreme Court heard the case twice" and upheld the regulation as a
valid exercise of the police power. Western Turf Association made
41 Piluso v. Spencer, 36 Cal. App. 416, 172 Pac. 412 (Dist. Ct. App. 1918) (public
resort) ; Crosswaith v. Burgin, 95 Colo. 241, 35 P.2d 848 (1934) (restaurant); Darius
v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 Pac. 510 (1920) (bootblacking stand) ; Baylies v. Curry,
30 Ill. App. 105, aff'd 128 Ill. 287, 21 N.E. 595 (1889) (theatre); Bolden v. Grand
Rapids Operating Corp., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N.W. 241 (1927) (theatre); Rhone v.

Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 77 N.W. 31 (1898) (upheld the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute but found that a saloon was not within the provisions of the act) ; Christie

v. 46th St Theatre Corp., 265 App. Div. 255, 39 N.Y.S2d 454, aff'd 292 N.Y. 643,
55 N.E2d 512 (1944), cert. denied, 323 US. 710 (1944) (theatre) ; Commonwealth v.
Moore, 32 Pa. D. & C. 630 (Dist. Ct. 1938) (hotel); Commonwealth v. George,

61 Pa. Super. 412 (1915) (theatre).
42323
Ill. 138, 153 N.E. 667 (1926).
43
Id. at 140-41, 153 N.E. at 668.
It 204 U.S. 359 (1906).
45 Greenberg v. Western Turf Ass'n, 140 Cal. 357, 73 Pac. 1050 (1903), 148 Cal.
126, 82 Pac. 684 (1905)
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four arguments before the Supreme Court. First, it contended that the
statute denied equal protection of the law. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, found this argument without merit, "for the statute
is applicable to all persons, corporations, or associations conducting
places of public amusement or entertainment.""8 The second and third
contentions were that the statute abridged the rights and privileges of
citizens and deprived the race track corporation of liberty without due
process of law. The second argument was denied because "a corporation cannot be deemed a citizen within the meaning of the clause of
the Constitution of the United States which protects the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States against being abridged or
impaired by the law of a state."4 7 Roughly the same observation disposed of the third contention, "for the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation without due process of law is
the liberty of natural, not artificial persons."4 The main argument of
the case was that the public accommodations statute deprived the corporation of property rights without due process. In denying this contention, Mr. Justice Harlan recognized the sweeping scope of police
power regulation:
Decisions of this court, familiar to all, and which need not be cited,
recognize the possession, by each state, of powers never surrendered to
the general government; which powers the state, except as restrained by
its own Constitution or the Constitution of the United States, may exert
not only for the public health, the public morals, and the public safety,
but for the general or common good, for the well-being, comfort, and good
order of the people. The enactments of a state, when exerting its power
for such purposes, must be respected by this court, if they do not violate
rights granted or secured by the supreme law of the land.49
The second case before the United States Supreme Court which
tested the constitutionality of public accommodations statutes came
from Michigan. In Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan,5 0 a Negro was
denied passage on a vessel used to transport patrons between Detroit
and its amusement park located on an island in Canadian waters.
Michigan courts found that the vessel was a public conveyance within
the statutory requirements of their public accommodations law.
The Bob-Lo Company contended that the statute could not be applied to them because article I, section 8, of the Constitution gives Congress exclusive power to control interstate and foreign commerce. The
46 Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1906).
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.

49

Ibid.

503 33 U.S. 28 (1948).
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question considered by the Supreme Court was whether the Michigan
court was correct in holding that the commerce clause did not forbid applying the public accommodations act to sustain the conviction. Mr.
Justice Rutledge, speaking for the Court, held that while the company's transportation of its patrons was foreign commerce and within
the scope of the Constitution, the power of Congress over foreign commerce did not exclude state regulation which was consistent with
federal policy."
1. Limited construction. The fact that public accommodations statutes have been held to be constitutional does not mean that they have
had a wide and liberal interpretation or application. To the contrary,
many courts have exhibited decided hostility to them by using the
following principles of construction to insure limited application: (1)
the statutes are in derogation of the common law, except as -applied to
innkeepers, common carriers and certain utilities and, as such, are to
be strictly construed; (2) penal statutes must be narrowly construed;
(3) the statutes limit the use of private property; and (4) Lord Tenderden's Rule, or the rule of ejusdem generis 2
These rules of construction have served at one time or another to
exclude from coverage of public accommodations statutes such facilities and accommodations as ice cream and soda fountains,"3 skating
rinks," billiard rooms, 5 barber shops,56 family or apartment hotels, 7
saloons," bootblacking stands, 9 mercantile establishments, 0 ceme"IHowever, see Pryce v. Swedish-American Lines, 30 F. Supp. 371 (1939), where
it was held that the New York public accommodations statute could not be construed
as forbidding racial discrimination between passengers by common carriers engaged in
commerce between the Port of New York and foreign ports, since, if so construed, the
statute
would illegally interfere with foreign commerce.
-2Brx,
LAw DiCmioxARY 651 (4th ed. 1951), explains ejusdem generis, as follows:
In the construction of laws, wills and other instruments, the 'ejusdem generis rule'
is that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words
of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed
in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of
the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
H Cecil v. Green, 161 IlL 265, 43 N.E. 1105 (1896) ; Chochos v. Burden, 74 Ind. App.
244, 128 N.E. 696 (1920) ; Brown v. Meyer Sanitary Milk Co., 150 Kan. 931, 96 P.2d
651 (1939) ; Goff v. Savage, 122 Wash. 194,210 Pac. 374 (1922).
54
Bowlin v. Lyon, 67 Iowa 536,25 N.W. 766 (1885).
5
6 Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 247 (1866).
5
6 Faulkner v. Solazzi, 79 Conn. 541, 65 Atl. 947 (1907) ; Messenger v. State, 25
Neb. 674, 41 N.W. 638 (1889).
57Alsberg
v. Lucerne Hotel Co., 46 Misc. 617, 92 N.Y. S. 851 (1905).
58
Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200, 77 N.W. 31 (1898) ; Gibbs v. Arras Bros., Inc.,
222 N.Y. 332, 118 N.E. 857 (1918) ; Kellar v. Koerber, 61 Ohio St. 388, 55 N.E. 1002

(1899).
50

Burks v. Bosso, 180 N.Y. 341, 73 N.E. 58 (1905).
00 Brown v. J. H. Bull Co., 146 Iowa 89, 124 N.W. 901 (1910).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 40 : 841

teries, 6' dance halls,62 restaurants,6 8 beauty parlors,64 golf courses,"5
women s apparel stores,66 dentists' offices67 and gymnasiums."
A few selected examples will show how courts have narrowed the
effect of public accommodations statutes. In Faulkner v. Solazzi,"9 a
Negro was refused service at a barber shop. Hinging its decision on
the "private property" argument, the Connecticut Supreme Court
found that public regulation had effect only
... from the devotion of the property of the business agency to a use in
which the public has an interest, so that the manner of its use is of public
consequence and affects the community at large, and especially if a natural
or virtual monopoly is enjoyed, as in the case of railroads, telegraph and
telephone companies, theatres and places of public amusement, gas and
water companies, public warehouses, grain elevators, etc.70

In Gibbs v. Arras Brothers,Inc.,71 several Negroes were refused drinks
in a public saloon. The New York Court of Appeals, upholding a lower
court finding that a liquor saloon was not a place of public accommodation, said:
... the statute must be strictly construed for the reason that it imposes
restrictions upon the control of management of private property by the
owner and is both penal and criminal. Its effect is not to be extended
through implication or analogy.72

In Harvey, Inc. v. Sissle," a retail store selling apparel for women was
held not to be included within the statutory provision, "other places
of public accommodation and amusement." Using the ejusdem generis
rule to justify the restrictive interpretation, the Ohio court said:
In olden times we were taught that the right of private contract was a
constitutional guaranty. If a farmer had grain or cattle to sell or a
manufacturer had machinery to sell or a merchant had merchandise to
sell, we were told that he could sell it whenever, to whomsoever and upon
61 People ex rel. Gaskill v. Forest Home Cemetery Co., 258 Ill. 36, 101 N.E. 219

(1913), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 606 (1915) ; Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Cemetery,

Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110, aff'd 348 U.S. 880 (1954), vacated, 349 U.S. 70
(1955).
62

Johnson v. Auburn & Syracuse Elec. R.R. Co., 169 App. Div. 864, 156 N.Y. Supp.

93, rev'd, 222 N.Y. 443, 119 N.E. 72 (1918).

63 State v. Brown, 112 Kan. 814, 212 Pac. 663 (1923).

64 Campbell v. Eichert, 155 Misc. 164, 278 N.Y. Supp. 946 (App. T. 1935).
65 Delaney v. Central Valley Golf Club, Inc., 28 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Sup. Ct), aff'd,
263 App. Div. 710, 31 N.Y.S.2d 834, aff'd, 289 N.Y. 577, 43 N.E.2d 716 (1942).
66 Harvey, Inc. v. Sissle, 53 Ohio App. 405 (1936).
67 Coleman v. Middlestaff, 147 Cal. App.2d 833, 305 P.2d 1020 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1957) ; Rice v. Rinaldo, 59 Ohio L. Abs. 568, 95 N.E2d 30 (C.P.), aff'd, 67 Ohio L.
Abs. 183, 119 N.E.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1951).
65 Gardner v. Vic Tanny Compton, Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr. 490 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).

69 79 Conn. 541, 65 At. 947 (1907).
701d. at 542, 65 Atl. at 947.

72

71222 N.Y. 332, 118 N.E. 857 (1918).

73 53 Ohio App. 405 (1936).

Id. at 335, 118 N.E. at 858
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whatever terms he chose. He could refuse to sell to a German, Irishman,
Negro, Jew or any other person for any or no reason. It is now said that
this former concept must be modified to the extent that anyone who offers
the market price for his wares may enforce the sale. Before this modificabecomes statute law, it should at least
tion of the right of private contract
7
receive legislative declaration. '
A more recent California case, Coleman v. Middlestaff,7 represents an
instance when a young Negro made a telephone appointment with a
dentist to have a painful tooth extracted. He was then refused service
because of his race. The court, applying rules of strict construction,

held that a dentist's office was not included within the statutory provision, "other public places of amusement and accommodation."
2. Liberal construction. Ambiguous and unclear statutory provisions
have probably contributed to some of these restrictive decisions. However, legislatures cannot be blamed for all of them. Courts have not
been entirely consistent in applying the statutes. A line of precedent
now runs directly counter to the aforementioned narrow decisions.
There are any number of reported cases where such facilities as
hotels,"7 restaurants,"8 theaters,"8 skating rinks," saloons and taverns, 8'
74 Id. at 408-09.
7147 Cal. App.2d 833, 305 P.?d 1020 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957).
7
6 Narrow construction has also resulted in restricting the types of relief available
to persons discrimixtated against. See Comment, Availability of Injunctive Relief
Under State Civil Rights Acts, 14 U. Car. L. REV. 174 (1956) and Comment Private
Remedies
Under State Equal Rights Statutes,44 I. L REv. 363 (1949).
7
7 Fruchey v. Eagleson, 15 Ind. App. 88, 43 N.E. 146 (1895) ; Evans v. Ross, 57
N.J. Super. 223, 154 A.2d 441 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959) ; Hobson v. York Studios,
208 Misc. 888, 145 N.Y.S2d 162 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1955) ; Commonwealth v. Moore,
32 7Pa.
D. & C. 630 (Dist. Ct. 1938).
8
Powell v. Utz, 87 F. Supp. 811 (1949); Crosswaith v. Bergin, 95 Colo. 241,
35 P2d 849 (1934); Humbard v. Crawford, 128 Iowa 743, 105 N.W. 33 (1905);
Bryant v. Rich's Grill, 216 Mass. 344, 103 N.E. 925 (1914) ;Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich.
358, 46 N.W. 718 (1912) ; Wilson v. Razzetti, 88 Misc. 37, 150 N.Y.S. 145 (App. T.
1914) ; Hart v. Hartford Lunch Co., 81 Misc. 237, 142 N.Y.S. 515 (App. T. 1913) ;
Baer v. Washington Heights Cafe, 168 N.Y.S. 567 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1917) ; Young v.
Pratt, 11 Ohio App. 346 (1919) ; McCrary v. Jones, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 612, 39 N.E.2d
1677 (Ct. App. 1941) ; Bryan v. Adler, 97 Wis. 124, 72 N.W. 368 (1897).
9 Prowd v. Gore, 57 Cal. App. 548, 207 Pac. 490 (Dist. Ct. App. 1922) ; Jones v.
Kehrlein, 49 Cal. App. 646, 194 Pac. 55 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920) ; Pickett v. Kuchan, 323
Ill. 138, 153 N.E. 667 (1926) ; Baylies v. Curry, 30 Ill.
App. 105, aff'd, 128 Ill. 287,
21 N.E. 595 (1889); Baylie v. Washington Theater Co., 218 Ind. 513, 34 N.E2d 17
(1941) ; Joseph v. Bidwell, 28 La. Ann. 382 (1876) ; Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Corp., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N.W. 241 (1927); Christie v. 46th St. Theater Corp.,
265 App. Div. 255, 39 N.Y.S.2d 454, aff'd, 292 N.Y. 643, 55 N.E.2d 512 (1944), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 710 (1944); Wolcott v. Shubert, 169 App. Div. 194, 154 N.Y.S. 643
(App. Div. 1915); Joyner v. Moore-Wiggins Co., 152 App. Div. 266, 136 N.Y.S. 578,
aff'd, 211 N.Y. 522, 105 N.E. 1088 (1912); Guy v. Tn-State Amusement Co., 7 Ohio
App. 509 (1917); Commonwealth v. George, 61 Pa. Super. 412 (1915); Randall v.
Cowlitz Amusements, 194 Wash. 82, 76 P.2d 1017 (1938); Anderson v. Pantages
Theater Co., 114 Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813 (1921).
oProctor v. Mt. Vernon Arena, 292 N.Y. 168, 54 N.E2d 349 (1944); People v.
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bowling alleys, 2 public resorts, 8 bootblacking stands," dancing pavilions and ballrooms8 5 soda fountains," swimming pools, beaches and
bathhouses,8 7 clubhouses of race tracks,"8 golf courses,8 " shoe stores"
and reducing salons9 ' have been held to be encompassed by public
accommodations statutes. That these facilities have been held to be
public in nature is not so illuminating as the reasoning some courts
have used to find them so. Some of these facilities are dearly included
in the wording of respective statutes, giving courts little or no discretion in considering them subjects of regulation. This, however, has not
been true in all instances. For example, in a New York case, Babb v.
Elsinger5 2 the court applied the ejusdem generis rule, but found a
saloon was a public facility even though it was not an "inn" or "hotel"
as provided by the law. The court felt that a saloon was of the same
character and kind as those facilities enumerated and therefore came
within the statutory scope.
In Dariusv. Apostolos9 3 the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged
that the public accommodations statute was penal and that the rule of
strict construction applied, but refused to follow a New York case,
Burks v. Bosso,9 which had held a bootblacking stand was not a public
facility. The court said of the Burks decision:
This, we think is incorrect.... A bootblacking stand is a "place of public
accommodation." It is of the same general class as "barber shops," in
that the business of each consists principally in furnishing personal service
King, 110 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245 (1888); Jones v. Broadway Roller Rink Co. 136 Wis.
595, 118 N.W. 270 (1908).

81
Evans v. Fong Poy, 42 Cal. App. 320, 108 P.2d 942 (1941); Denny v. Dorr, 333
Ill. App. 581, 78 N.E2d 114 (1948); Springer v. McDermott, 173 N.Y.S. 98 (App. Div.
1919); Tobias v. Riehm, 162 N.Y.S. 976 (App. Div. 1917); Babb v Elsinger, 147 N.Y.S.
98 (App. Div. 1914); Bryan v. Adler, 97 Wis. 124, 72 N.W. 8 (1897).

812Central Amusement Co. v. District of Columbia, 121 A.2d 865 (Munic. Ct. App.
D.C. 1956).
83 Piluso v. Spencer, 36 Cal. App. 416, 172 Pac. 412 (1918).
84 Darius v. Apastolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 Pac. 510 (1920).
85 Amos v. Prom, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 615 (D.C. Iowa, 1954); Youngstown Park &
Falls
86 St. Ry. Co. v. Tokus, 4 Ohio App. 276 (1915).

Hutson v. Owl Drug Store, 79 Cal. App. 390, 249 Pac. 524 (1926) ; State v. Katz,
40 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 1949).
87 State v. Rosecliff Realty Corp., 62 A.2d 488 (N.J. 1948); Norman v. City Island
Beach Co., 126 Misc. 335, 213 N.Y.S. 379 (1926); Commonwealth v. Gibney, 21 Pa.
D. & C.2d 5 (C.P. of Chester Co. 1960); Everett v. Harron, 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383
(1954) ; Commonwealth v. Figari, 166 Pa. Super. 169, 70 A2d 666 (1950).
88 Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club, 45 Cal. App.2d 283, 114 P.2d 27 (1941).
89
Gillespie v. Lake Shore Golf Club, 91 N.E.2d 290 (Ohio App. 1950).
50
Lambert v. Mandel's of California, 156 Cal. App.2d 855, 319 P.2d 469 (Los
Angeles Co. Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1957).
91 Browning v. Slenderella Systems of Seattle, 54 Wn.2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959).
52 147 N.Y.S. 98 (App. Div. 1914)
52368 Colo. 323, 190 Pac. 510 (1920)
94 180 N.Y. 341, 73 N.E. 58 (Ct. App. 1905)
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and the two are quite generally operated in conjunction... the doctrine
of ejusdem generis is not applicable."5
Exclusion of a Negro from a theater caused the Indiana Supreme
Court, in a case upholding the application of that state's public accommodations statute, to say: "It is true that this is a penal statute and
should be strictly construed but strict construction does not require us
to ignore the plain meaning of the statute."96
Several other early cases show that strict construction of public
accommodations statutes did not necessarily require state courts to
depart from clear legislative intent. However, a more recent New York
case, Camp-of-the-Pines v. New York Times Co.,9 7 represents a decided
departure from traditional and restrictive court attitudes. In this case,
the proprietor of a vacation camp brought suit against the New York
Times for an alleged breach of contract in refusing to publish advertisements that the camp was operated for the benefit of "select clientele." The court, in denying the suit, pointed out that discrimination,
either direct or indirect, against any person because of race, color or
religion was barred under the state's public accommodations law. Furthermore, the court felt that the words, "select clientele," if printed in
the newspaper, would have violated the statute. Perhaps even more
important, the court held that the public accommodations statute was
remedialand must be liberally construed.
Camp-of-the-Pinesserved as a useful precedent to other state courts.
9 8 the Pennsylvania
For example, in Everett v. Harron,
Supreme Court
held that a swimming pool was a place of public accommodation and
fell under statutory prohibitions against discrimination. In addition,
the court held that the cause of action in the case was a tort and granted
injunction relief against the swimming pool operator. An Iowa case,
Amos v. Prom," held a public ballroom to be a place of amusement
within the Iowa statute. The court pointed out that "It]he rule of
ejusdem generis is to be used as an aid in ascertaining the intent of a
statute and not to thwart it."10 A New York court, upholding a prosecution against a hotel owner for denying a room to an interracially
married couple, held that the state's public accommodations statute
was remedial and must be liberally construed. 0 1 California has held
95 68 Colo. at 326, 190 Pac. at 511

06 Bailey v. Washington Theatre Co., 218 Ind. 513, 518, 34 N.E.2d 17, 18-19 (1941).
11184 Misc. 389, 53 N.Y.S2d 475 (Sup. Ct, Special T. 1945)
98 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1954)
09117 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Iowa 1954)
10
0Id. at 625
lol Hobson v. York Studios, 145 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Manic. Ct. N.Y. City 1955).
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that the state's public accommodations law is to be given a liberal
construction and that a store retailing shoes is included under the
provision, "all other places of public accommodation."'0 2 Negroes who
were refused service because of their race were allowed to maintain
action for damages.
In a New Jersey case, Evans v. Ross,' concerning discrimination
by the proprietor of a dining room, the court found that in construing
the public accommodations statute it was obliged to give effect to the
overriding plan or purpose of the legislature as fairly expressed in the
language of the statute and must avoid any interpretation that would
render any part inoperative, superfluous or meaningless.
The Washington court, in Browning v. Slenderella Systems,0 4 held
that a reducing salon was a public accommodation. The court pointed
out that discrimination in violation of the public accommodations
statute might arise through "subtleties of conduct" as well as an openly
expressed refusal to serve, and might arise even though no physical
violence was used or threatened and the discriminator was courteous.
The court's liberal interpretation also allowed for civil damages, even
though specific statutory provisions were not available for them.

III.

ACTIVITIES OF STATE COMMISSIONS

A. Regulatory and Non-regulatory Activities0 5
Sixteen states have now given anti-discrimination commissions responsibilities to eliminate discrimination in public accommodations.
The programs and activities of these commissions vary widely. Therefore, only general observations can be made regarding them.
1. Regulatory Programs. Formal adjudicatory proceedings play a
very small part in the activities of anti-discrimination commissions;
the vast majority of complaints are adjusted by conciliation processes.
The Indiana Civil Rights Commission has reported that not one complaint has been taken to a public hearing, although approximately
twenty-five complaints per month have been handled since their public
accommodations statute went into effect.'
Kansas has processed six
102 Lambert v. Mandel's of California, 156 Cal. App2d 855, 319 P.2d 469 (Los
Angeles Co. Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1957).
103 57 N.J. Super. 223, 154 A.2d 441 (App. Div. 1959).

54 Wn.2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959).
Regulatory activities are regarded as those procedures ordinarily considered to
be of a "judicial" nature. These include both "formal" and "informal" processes. Nonregulatory activities are the variety of functions anti-discrimination commissions
undertake
to supplement and complement their regulatory responsibilities.
0 6
'
Letter from Dr. Donald M. Royer, Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n, to Wallace F.
Caldwell, Sept. 13, 1963.
104

105

1965]

STATE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS

complaints so far under its law: five have been closed without public
hearing."' 7 Annual reports of other anti-discrimination commissions
tell a similar story. The Race Relations Law Reporter, which has
undertaken since May, 1954, to publish materials where the issue of
race or color is presented as having legal consequences, reports through
1964 only ten instances where anti-discrimination commissions have
held formal hearings on complaints. Four of these cases were from
Ohio,... two from New York' and Pennsylvani 1 0 and one each from
Colorado" 1 and Washington." 2 Two complaints resulted from discrimination by tavern owners, four from discrimination by barbers,
and one each from discrimination in the use of roller-rink facilities, a
golf course, a cemetery and discriminatory advertising by a resort
owner. Discrimination was found in every instance and cease and desist
orders were issued.
The paucity of reported instances of administrative adjudication
suggests a timidity or reluctance on the part of anti-discrimination
commissions to resort to formal sanctions. It might also partially be
explained by the efficacy of the conciliation process. The fact of the
matter, however, probably lies somewhere between these two positions.
Anti-discrimination commissions do seem to be reluctant to proceed to
the formal hearing stage unless they have a very good case and only
after conciliation procedures have been exhausted. The success of the
conciliation process and the fact that most complaints do not require
formal hearings also seem to stem from the adoption by commissions
of what might be called "follow-up procedure.""' 3 This procedure
works as follows: when a complaint of discrimination in the use of a
07 Personal interview with Mr. Carl W. Glatt, Executive Director, Kansas Comm'n
on Civil Rights, Topeka, Kansas, Dec. 31, 1963.
108 Gegner, 7 R.AcE Ra. L. REP. 974-76 (Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n 1962); Rollercade Skating Rink, 7 RACE RE. L. REP. 985-88 (Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n 1962);
Frye, 7 RAc5 Rm. L. REP. 1293-95 (Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 1962);Rose Hill
Securities Co., 8 RACE. REL. L. REP. 749-61 (Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 1963).
109 State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Trowbridge, 5 RACE RE. L. REP. 552
(New York Conm'n Against Discrimination, 1960) ; and State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Mustachio, 6 RAcE Ra. L. REP. 355-59 (New York Comm'n Against
Discrimination, 1961).
110 Armstrong v. Bell, 7 RAcE Ra. L. REP. 1283-89 (Penn. Human Rights Comm'n,
1963).
1,Clark v. Sherman, 7 RAcE. R L. L. REP. 308 (Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm'n,
1962).
112 Johnson v. Sheeler, 8 RACE. RF.. L. REP. 1725-26 (Wash. State Bd. Against
Discrimination, 1963).
113 E.g., the Executive Director of the Ohio Civil Rights Comn'n says, "I believe
the most successful technique employed involves follow-up in terms of either personal
observation by staff or compliance reports by the respondent." Letter from Ellis L.
Ross, Executive Director, Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, to Wallace F. Caldwell, Aug.
15, 1963.
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public accommodation has been made to an anti-discrimination commission, an investigator discusses the discriminatory act with the
owner or operator. Should the owner or operator agree to change his
policy, or should there be an indication that the discriminatory act
resulted from misunderstanding, the case is continued rather than
closed. The person discriminated against, or some other member of a
minority group, is then directed to the facility. If he is served without
discrimination, the case is then marked "adjusted" and closed. As an
alternative, commission staff members may from time to time visit the
accommodation to observe whether the discriminatory policy of the
facility has in fact been altered.
Follow-up procedure raises the question of whether the initial complainant has had his rights "bargained away." In those states that
allow criminal and civil procedures in lieu of, or in addition to, administrative remedies, the problem does not arise-the person subjected
to discrimination is still free to initiate civil proceedings against the
owner for damages suffered. However, the vast majority of complaints,
for reasons suggested below, are not made before courts. But follow-up
procedure and any "bargaining away" of an individual's rights which
may occur would appear to be justified by the changed policy on the
part of the owner or operator of the facility without incurring hostility
or necessitating the expense and time involved in litigation and the
realization by all members of minority groups of the opportunity to
use the facility or accommodation on future occasions. While the
jurisprudential "soundness" of this procedure is subject to debate, it
does seem to be in keeping with the reasons for establishing antidiscrimination commissions and with the best interests of all members
of minority groups.
Follow-up procedure also raises the problem of whether an individual's rights have not been sacrificed for the realization of superior
"group rights." It must be kept in mind, however, that "rights" realized by members of minority groups by the use of follow-up procedure
are not superior "rights." What is realized are the rights of individuals, who also happen to be members of a minority group, to be treated
like anyone else, i.e., without regard to their race, creed, color, etc.
They are merely placed in the same status and subjected to the same
disqualifications as other persons.
The reluctance of anti-discrimination commissions to resort to formal
adjudicatory hearings might also be explained, in some instances, by
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the difficulty of proving discrimination and the procedural requirements that have been foisted upon agencies by enabling statutes. For
example, the Kansas public accommodations statute requires the Commission on Civil Rights to follow rules of evidence and procedure prevailing in courts of law and equity. The Executive Director of that
Commission, Mr. Carl W. Glatt, maintains that proof of discrimination often requires the submission and consideration of evidence and
information that would be unacceptable under these rules. Hence,
when an owner or operator of a public accommodation is adamant in
refusing to change his discriminatory policy, the Commission's "hands
are tied." It does not wish to risk its "reputation" by pursuing a case
that might well be quashed for procedural irregularities in appeal to
the courts.114
Since most public accommodations complaints are settled amicably
by the conciliation process and formal sanctions rarely resorted to,
possible abuse of administrative discretion by anti-discrimination commissions might be avoided by having sanctioning power exclusively in
the hands of courts. This procedure, however, has been found to be
unsuccessful for a number of reasons and, although still used in some
states, it has been supplemented by administrative remedies. The
experience of several commissions illustrates some of the problems
involved when anti-discrimination commissions are not given powers
to issue orders.
Ohio first enacted a public accommodations statute in 1884, permitting a choice of filing a civil suit for damages or proceeding by
criminal action. The records show that despite the provisions permitting maximum civil damages of 500 dollars there were few, if any,
cases indicating payments over 300 dollars, and these were infinitesimally few. In fact, fines were often levied against a guilty party in
the sum of one dollar. With regard to the election of criminal procedure under the law, there was always the factual consideration of the
requirement that a case be heard in the county in which the alleged discriminatory act occurred. Pre-judgment notwithstanding, it was not
unusual for a complainant who was not a native of the defendant's
county to be confronted with a "home-town" sheriff, prosecutor, judge
and/or jury. These odds were difficult to overcome. Research undertaken by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission in 1960 clearly established
114 Personal interview with Carl W. Glatt, Executive Director, Kansas Comm'n on
Civil Rights, Topeka, Kansas, Jan. 2, 1964.
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the fact of discrimination in every section of the state despite the public
accommodations statute. Based on this research and recommendations
to the legislature and governor, the Civil Rights Commission was given
regulatory jurisdiction in the area of public accommodations in 1961.
The old law remains on the books however, and enables a complainant
to file under either or both." 5
The experience of Ohio has been duplicated in a number of other
states. For example, the Executive Director of the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights gives the following reasons why efforts were made
to get an enforceable "administrative agency type" of public accommodations law enacted:
a. This criminal statute placed the burden of following through with a
complaint upon the complainant whose financial resources might not
permit extensive legal action involving numerous appeals.
b. Enforcement varied among county attorneys-some were indifferent,
some were outright negative in refusing to process complaints in their
counties, some did process complaints diligently depending on their own
philosophy regarding racial matters or the fact of a large Negro voting
constituency in their area. But it was the uncertainty of this enforcement
which created the need for the new law.
c. The coverage was limited in substantive scope and also through interpretation. That is, the phrase "for which a license is required by any
of the municipal authorities of this state" caused some county attorneys
to rule6 certain places of public accommodations were not covered by the
law."
A research sociologist attached to the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, Dr. Donald M. Royer, gives somewhat similar reasons why
that state's public accommodations statute, minus administrative remedies, did not work:
We found that the law was not used because: a) many of the people who
had complaints could not afford the legal fees involved in employing a
lawyer or felt the legal process was too laborious to warrant the time and
money involved, and b) most Negroes were not aware that they could use
the services of the local prosecuting attorney to fight the case, and when
they were aware of it they were skeptical of his willingness to act on
their behalf. Our own experience with prosecuting attorneys tends to
support their skepticism. The prosecutor's reluctance seems to be based
on two grounds: a) the political sensitivity of his job, i.e., civil rights
135 Conclusion based on a letter from Ellis L. Ross, Executive Director, Ohio Civil
Rights Comm'n, to Wallace F. Caldwell, Aug. 15, 1963.
116 Letter from Carl W. Glatt, Executive Director, Kansas Comm'n on Civil Rights
to Wallace F. Caldwell, July 19, 1963.
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actions often alienate the voting public, and b) involvement in other more
pressing cases. The new law gives the initiative for prosecution to the
agency most directly concerned with the problem, the Civil Rights
17
Commission.
These comments might be partially discounted due to the nature of
the source. Each writer undoubtedly has a personal attachment to,
and an interest in, the purposes of public accommodations legislation.
More impartial studies, however, tend to indicate that the substance
of their contentions is correct. For example, Professor Robert E.
Goostree undertook a survey of all county attorneys in Iowa regarding
the enforcement of that state's public accommodations law and found,
among other things, that: (1) judges and juries were not "friendly"
to public accommodations suits; and (2) the prosecution of public
accommodations offenders was not as vigorous as it might have been." 8
2. Non-regulatory Activities. All commissions charged with eliminating discrimination in public accommodations emphasize the importance of maintaining a continuing "grass roots" educational program.
These programs seem primarily to serve two purposes: (1) to disseminate to potential complainants information concerning their rights
under law, and (2) to inform owners and operators of public accommodations of their obligations. Publicizing takes place by using all
communications media, e.g., press, radio, television, public speeches,
etc., and by distributing pamphlets and other written materials. These
activities are limited by certain factors, such as time available, number
of staff members and operating budgets. The effect of the programs
are impossible to calculate and some dissemination techniques are
probably of questionable effectiveness. Nevertheless, education seems
to be an important part of all commission programs and should not be
underemphasized by any analyst. Several other commission activities
also deserve mention.
Commissions are now increasingly instituting what is called the
"industry-wide approach" to eliminate discrimination in public accommodations. This approach entails the convening of various groups, e.g.,
motel, hotel, barber and beauty shop owners and operators, through
their professional associations and organizations, to review provisions
of public accommodations laws and expose commission staff members
to questions relative to the manner and means of compliance. The
117 Letter from Dr. Donald M. Royer, Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n to Wallace F.

Caldwell, Sept 13, 1963.
118 Goostree, The Iowa Civil Rights Statute: A Problem of Enforcement, 37 IowA
L. Rav. 242 (1951).
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approach may also entail formal compliance agreements on the part
of the owners and operators. Whether industry-wide procedure is in
fact effective is a matter of judgment. For example, the Executive
Director of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, Mr. Ellis L. Ross,
reports that "we have approved in some instances an industry-wide
approach which I am inclined to believe is an improvement over the
case-by-case method."'19
Most anti-discrimination commissions also use personal visitations
to secure compliance with the law. These visitations may be ad hoc
and sporadic, or they may be comprehensive and designed to cover all
facilities in a given area of a state.
Commissions also mail out vast quantities of notices which are
required to be posted on the premises of facilities. Thus, for example,
the Executive Director of the Kansas Civil Rights Commission, Mr.
Carl W. Glatt, reports that his Commission mailed out approximately
8,500 notices when the Kansas public accommodations law was first
enacted and sends approximately 150 to 200 replacements and new
additions each month.' The effectiveness of these notices is subject to
some difference of opinion. Mr. Glatt indicates that his staff, through
personal visits, has found approximately fifty per cent compliance with
posting requirements.' However, Mr. Ellis L. Ross of the Ohio Civil
Rights Commission says, "Our experience inclines us to believe that
the least effective part of the entire program was the mere mailing of
the mandatory notices ...
22
posted."'

and assuming that they would be properly
CONCLUSION

Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have legally prohibited discrimination in places of public accommodations. Sixteen of
these states have provided for administrative enforcement of their
laws. This type of information is not by itself very enlightening. It
does, however, indicate that a large number of Northern and Western
states have been concerned enough about civil rights problems to enact
public measures to provide relief for minority group citizens who suffer
unequal treatment when they seek to secure their rights.
119 Letter from Ellis L. Ross, Executive Director, Kansas Comm'n on Civil Rights
to Wallace F. Caldwell, Aug. 15, 1963.
120 Personal interview with Carl W. Glatt, Executive Director, Kansas Comm'n on
Civil Rights, Topeka, Kansas, Dec. 31, 1963.
121

Ibid.

Letter from Ellis L. Ross, Executive Director, Kansas Comm'n on Civil Rights
to Wallace F. Caldwell, Aug. 15, 1963.
122
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An overview of public accommodation legislation illustrates some of
the problems inherent in a federal system of government. Coverage of
the laws, in terms of prohibited conduct, varies greatly from state to
state. A number of states still do not have statutes to provide
relief from discrimination. The most conspicuous example of the latter
is the block of Southern states which seceded from the Union during
the Civil War. It should be noted, however, that there are still some
Northern and Western states which have not ventured into this "sensitive" area of public policy. There has also been a rather haphazard
development of remedies available under currently effective public
accommodations laws. The well-tested administrative process has not
yet been adopted in almost one-half the states with effective laws. Persons discriminated against in these states have to bear the burden of
seeking relief in civil proceedings or of having a local prosecutor institute criminal action.
The failure of some states to act and the rather haphazard development of existing statutory coverage and remedies available under state
statutes resulted in a need for some type of national solution to the
problem of discrimination in public accommodations. Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 seems to offer a partial solution. The constitutionality of this measure has now been established. But it would
seem that the statute is complementary and was not meant to supplant
remedies available to citizens in states which have effective public
accommodations statutes. It is difficult to gauge what long-range effect
this new federal law will have on the activities and programs of state
anti-discrimination commissions. The answer, of course, will not be
clear until experience has been gained under its administration. However, it would seem that most state commissions will only be minimally
affected. If anything, the federal law should enable commissions to
operate in a climate of opinion more favorable to problem solving and
exercising current responsibilities. Problems may arise in coordinating
state and federal enforcement activities, but if coordination is undertaken in good faith this would not seem to be insurmountable. A
possibility also exists that a number of states that do not have public
accommodations laws and anti-discrimination commissions, or that
have existing laws which are not so comprehensive as the new federal
statute, may adopt or broaden laws and establish commissions. This
would certainly be a "step in the right direction" in so far as the philosophy of the federal statute is concerned. However, there is also a

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL-. 40 : 841

possibility that some states may establish commissions and pass public
accommodations laws ostensibly to stifle or delay the effect of the
federal law. This might result in some conflict, but the Attorney General, the Community Relations Service and the federal courts have
sufficient authority to circumvent any action that would tend to embarrass the act's purpose.
Public accommodations statutes are not new attempts to regulate in
the public interest. A number had their genesis in the period immediately following the Civil War. Their constitutionality also seems
beyond question. There are no reported cases where such statutes
have been held unconstitutional. Many courts have held that they are
clearly a proper exercise of the police power; they do not arbitrarily
deprive a person of liberty or property without due process of law;
nor do they infringe upon the right to contract or present arbitrary
classification schemes. While it does appear that, in passing laws under
the police power, there may be a certain amount of interference with
property rights, laws are not usually condemned on this account, unless
the interference amounts to a practical confiscation. Public accommodations statutes appear to present no problem in this respect. The
main difficulty in applying the statutes to specific instances of discrimination seems to be the narrow attitudes some state courts have taken
in regard to them. However, other courts have adopted a liberal attitude and applied the statutes within the obvious scope of legislative
intent. Even with a liberal approach, public accommodations statutes
hardly present a serious threat to any fundamental liberties that characterize a democratic society.
The use of the administrative process as a device to secure the rights
of citizens under public accommodations statutes can also hardly be
regarded as something which has been imposed upon the people. It has
been developed and perfected in a trial and error process in this particular sphere over almost a twenty-year period. This is not to say
that anti-discrimination commissions have been totally successful in
eliminating discrimination in public facilities. Improvement obviously
can and should be made. But measuring the success or lack of success
in eliminating discrimination is most difficult, for success is a relative
matter and depends to a large degree upon the perspective of those
who would measure it. Nevertheless, a wide variety of public accommodations have been desegregated as a direct result of anti-discrimination commission activities.
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